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The anterior insula (AI) maps visceral states and is active during emotional experiences,
a functional confluence that is central to neurobiological accounts of feelings. Yet, it is
unclear how AI activity correlates with feelings during social emotions, and whether this
correlation may be influenced by culture, as studies correlating real-time AI activity with
visceral states and feelings have focused on Western subjects feeling physical pain or
basic disgust. Given psychological evidence that social-emotional feelings are cognitively
constructed within cultural frames, we asked Chinese and American participants to
report their feeling strength to admiration and compassion-inducing narratives during
fMRI with simultaneous electrocardiogram recording. Trial-by-trial, cardiac arousal and
feeling strength correlated with ventral and dorsal AI activity bilaterally but predicted
different variance, suggesting that interoception and social-emotional feeling construction
are concurrent but dissociable AI functions. Further, although the variance that correlated
with cardiac arousal did not show cultural effects, the variance that correlated with
feelings did. Feeling strength was especially associated with ventral AI activity (the
autonomic modulatory sector) in the Chinese group but with dorsal AI activity (the
visceral-somatosensory/cognitive sector) in an American group not of Asian descent.
This cultural group difference held after controlling for posterior insula (PI) activity and
was replicated. A bi-cultural East-Asian American group showed intermediate results. The
findings help elucidate how the AI supports feelings and suggest that previous reports that
dorsal AI activation reflects feeling strength are culture related. More broadly, the results
suggest that the brain’s ability to construct conscious experiences of social emotion is less
closely tied to visceral processes than neurobiological models predict and at least partly
open to cultural influence and learning.
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INTRODUCTION
Emotions fundamentally involve body responses (James, 1894),
and the neural mapping of these responses is thought to form
the basis for emotional experiences, or feelings (Craig, 2002;
Damasio and Carvalho, 2013)—i.e., for the subjective, conscious
perception that one feels emotionally affected or “moved” by a
situation. Like all feelings of body states, such as feelings of cold
or heat (Craig et al., 2000), hunger or fullness (Del Parigi et al.,
2002), feelings of emotion-related physiological states are thought
to come most fully into awareness in the anterior insula (AI).
Though various cortical and subcortical systems contribute to
emotion, mood, and their regulation (e.g., amygdala, hypotha-
lamus, cingulate cortex), the AI is the cortical terminus for the
interoceptive maps from which conscious affective experiences
are thought to be constructed, such as maps of emotion-related
heart-rate changes (Craig, 2002; Critchley et al., 2005).
In keeping with theoretical accounts, the AI is activated when
individuals experience emotions (Damasio et al., 2000; Lamm
and Singer, 2010) and recent studies have demonstrated that
social-emotional feelings activate AI regions that overlap with
regions activated during interoceptive awareness (e.g., Zaki et al.,
2012). However, correlation of the AI’s real-time activity with
visceral responses and emotional feelings has focused on disgust
reactions to viewing body violations (e.g., Harrison et al., 2010)
or on affective experiences of body stimulation as noxious or
pleasant (e.g., Craig et al., 2000). Although the AI is activated
during emotions that rely on complex reasoning about the social
context, e.g., admiration for virtue and compassion (Immordino-
Yang et al., 2009), it is not clear how the activations correlate with
visceral responses and with feeling strength in these emotions.
This question is especially pertinent given psychological
evidence that constructing cognitively complex feelings is a
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dynamic, socially mediated, inferential process (Barrett et al.,
2007; Immordino-Yang, 2010; Seth, 2013) that is shaped by child-
hood and adolescent social experience (Eisenberg et al., 2006).
Reactions such as those to another’s virtue or social pain require
the onlooker to understand the broader circumstances of the
other person’s actions and from there to make social-cognitive
inferences about that person’s subjective experiences and quali-
ties of mind. The onlooker’s resulting physiological reaction (the
emotion) and experience (the feeling; Damasio, 1999) cannot rely
entirely on empathy as he or she experiences a different emo-
tion than the other person shows. (For example, an onlooker may
experience compassion when watching a man dine alone because
he knows that the man’s wife recently died. Or, the onlooker may
feel admiration for the virtue of a medical doctor who sacrifices
her own safety, affluence and comfort to work in a remote region
with dangerous health conditions—the doctor appears “con-
cerned and caring” but the onlooker feels “inspired.”) Because
social-emotional feelings are so heavily dependent on interpre-
tation and inference, it is possible that they may not be as tightly
tied to visceral reactions as are other feelings. It is also possible
that individuals construct social-emotional feelings in culturally
variable ways (Barrett, 2012; Immordino-Yang, 2013), and that
neural activity may therefore correlate with feelings differently
across cultural groups. These issues have not been investigated,
despite their implications for neurobiological and psychological
models of emotional feelings and sociality.
Given the above, we investigated how AI activity correlates in
real-time with cardiac arousal (an index of interoception), and
with social-emotional feeling strength (an index of a psycho-
logical process). During simultaneous fMRI and electrocardio-
gram (ECG) recording, participants reported trial-by-trial how
strongly emotional they felt to each of a series of short video
narrative stimuli piloted to induce social emotions of varying
strengths. We then analyzed AI activations during strong and
weak emotional experiences, and the trial-by-trial correlations
between activity magnitude in the AI, cardiac arousal and feel-
ing strength. We focused the psychological measure in our study
on social-emotional feeling strength because intensity of subjec-
tive affect is a centrally important and ubiquitous dimension of
emotional experience.
Because we were also interested to test whether cultural
background influences the neural processing of conscious emo-
tional feelings, we included Chinese participants recruited in
Beijing (CH) and two groups of Americans recruited in Los
Angeles: one mixed-ethnicity group of monolingual English-
speakers not of Asian descent (representative American group,
RA) and 2nd generation East-Asian group (Asian American,
AA). Emotion-related values and norms are different between
China and the United States (e.g., Markus and Kitayama, 1991;
Tsai, 2007). We examined each group’s data separately, and
then statistically compared the three group results. Finding a
significant CH to RA group difference would be suggestive
of a cultural effect, and finding a hybrid pattern in the AA
group, who are genetically Chinese but were raised in a bicul-
tural Chinese-American context, would strengthen the inter-
pretation that the finding is related to developmental cultural
exposure.
We separately examined the activity in the ventral and dor-
sal AI sectors, as they are cytoarchitecturally and functionally
distinct (Mesulam and Mufson, 1982a; Kurth et al., 2010), and
there are open questions as to how each supports feelings (Lamm
and Singer, 2010). The ventral AI is an evolutionarily old sector
(Mesulam and Mufson, 1982a) involved in autonomic modu-
lation (Mesulam and Mufson, 1982b; Mutschler et al., 2009)
and consistently implicated in fMRI studies of emotion process-
ing (Kurth et al., 2010). The dorsal AI is evolutionarily newer
(Mesulam and Mufson, 1982a) and more visceral somatosen-
sory related (Mesulam and Mufson, 1982b; Craig, 2002). The
dAI has been implicated in aspects of cognition/decision-making
(Mutschler et al., 2009; Kurth et al., 2010) and in interoceptive
and emotional awareness (Critchley et al., 2004; Zaki et al., 2012).
These sectors also display distinct patterns of functional connec-
tivity (Nelson et al., 2010; Deen et al., 2011), and studies have
linked individual differences in these sectors’ network connectiv-
ity to emotional and cognitive functioning (Seeley et al., 2007;
Touroutoglou et al., 2012).
In each cultural group, we expected both AI sectors to activate
when participants reported feeling emotional, and we expected
the activity to correlate with trial-by-trial changes in cardiac
arousal. Given these expectations were confirmed, we tested the
hypothesis that, for each group, the activity in each AI sector
in each hemisphere would correlate with participants’ real-time
reports of feeling strength, and that, trial-by-trial, the variance in
BOLD signal associated with feeling strength would be dissociable
from that associated with cardiac arousal (i.e., that the correla-
tion between feeling strength and BOLD signal would hold after
controlling for cardiac arousal). Independent variance would be
evidence for psychological processing of social-emotional feelings
in the AI above and beyond interoception.
We then tested for cultural effects on the BOLD variance
correlated uniquely with feelings. That is, we were interested
to uncover a cultural group difference in the correspondence
between fluctuations in BOLD signal magnitude and fluctuations
in feeling strength, especially if we would not find an absolute
difference between the groups in magnitude of BOLD signal
change or in magnitude of feelings. A cultural group difference
in the correspondence between BOLD signal change and feel-
ing strength would be evidence that developmental exposure to
culture influences the process by which individuals construct
conscious experiences of social emotions.
Given the novelty of our study, we did not attempt to hypoth-
esize a priori the direction of cultural differences. Instead, we
considered that our hypothesis of a cultural effect would be
confirmed if: (1) the correlation between AI BOLD signal mag-
nitude and feeling strength showed a significant interaction with
cultural group; (2) the results from the AA group were inter-
mediate between the results of the CH and RA groups; and, (3)
we could replicate the cultural group difference in a different
cohort of CH and RA participants with a different corpus of
stimuli.
We also tested for cultural effects on the variance correlated
uniquely with cardiac arousal; here we expected a negative result.
Interoceptive mapping of cardiac arousal is a basic physiologi-
cal function, unlike the psychological processing that undergirds
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emotional feelings (or even interoceptive awareness). We there-
fore did not expect it to be influenced by social norms.
Finally, as the AI is thought to re-map visceral states previously
mapped in the posterior insula (PI; Craig, 2002), we analyzed PI
correlations to cardiac arousal and feeling strength, and then con-
trolled for activity in the PI and reanalyzed correlations between
AI activity, cardiac arousal, and feeling strength. We expected the
PI to be activated to our stimuli. We expected that PI activity
would correlate with cardiac arousal but not with feeling strength,
as subjective interpretations or experiences of physiological states
(feelings) are thought to come most fully into awareness only at
the level of the AI. Finally, we hypothesized that controlling for
PI activity would render AI correlations to cardiac arousal non-
significant but would not alter patterns of correlation between AI
activity and feelings. Were these expectations confirmed, it would
provide additional evidence that social-emotional feelings are
processed relatively independently from body states in the insula.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Participants were healthy, right-handed, and neurologically nor-
mal. [Handedness was assessed using a modified version of the
Edinburgh handedness questionnaire (Oldfield, 1971), which
ranges from −14 (strongly left-handed) to +14 (strongly right-
handed). All participants scored 11 or higher.] Participants
ranged in age from 18 to 30 years. All participants reported nor-
mal or corrected-to-normal vision and normal hearing. None
had a history of neurological or psychiatric disorder, physical
or emotional abuse, and none were using psychotropic medi-
cation. None reported a medical condition that would preclude
scanning. All participants gave written informed consent in accor-
dance with the requirements of the Institutional Review Boards of
the University of Southern California (USC) and Beijing Normal
University (BNU). Participants were compensated for their par-
ticipation in accordance with the norms of their university
community.
Chinese group (CH)
Fifteen monolingual Mandarin-speaking Chinese participants
were recruited from the BNU community (7 females; average age
22.9 years, SD = 3.47). All were born to monolingual Mandarin-
speaking parents and raised in mainland China, and none had
resided outside of China.
Representative American group, excluding Americans of Asian
descent (RA)
Sixteen monolingual English-speaking American participants not
of Asian descent (8 females; average age 22.4 years, SD = 2.87;
12 Caucasian, 2 Latino, and 2 African-American) were recruited
from USC. Participants were raised in the U.S. by monolingual
English-speaking American-born parents. The composition of
this group was representative of the American student popula-
tion at USC, except that it did not include participants of Asian
descent.
East-Asian American group (AA)
Sixteen second-generation East Asian-American participants (8
females; average age 20.4 years, SD = 1.44) were recruited from
the USC community in Los Angeles. Participants’ parents had
been born and raised in China (n = 14) or Korea (n = 2).
Participants had lived in the United States from before age 6, the
approximate age at which formal schooling begins (13 had been
born in the U.S.). All reported English as their primary language.
Replication group
Data from additional groups of 14 Chinese and 13 American
participants were utilized for the replication study (see below).
PROTOCOL
Participants were told that they would be exposed to a series of
true stories about real people’s lives, and that they should feel
comfortable reporting their honest feelings in response to each.
Following a previously developed protocol (see Immordino-Yang
et al., 2009), participants were first introduced to the narrative
stimuli in a private preparation session outside of the scan-
ner in which an experimenter verbally recounted the series of
scripted narrative stimuli in one of two counterbalanced orders
and presented an accompanying full-length video of each protag-
onist on a laptop computer. Each narrative took approximately
60–90 s total to present, including showing the video (average
video length was 43 s). This preparation session was necessary
mainly because the narratives in full form were too long to
show in the scanner in sufficient numbers to obtain reliable
neuroimaging results, and shorter narratives would have been
unlikely to induce genuine social emotions beyond empathy (i.e.,
beyond mirroring of the emotion being displayed by the protag-
onist). This method also allowed us to systematize the amount
of exposure each participant had with each narrative prior to
scanning (as compared with leaving participants on their own
to familiarize themselves with each narrative). These prepara-
tion sessions were also videotaped for future studies of partici-
pants’ behavior. For more details on the preparation sessions, see
Immordino-Yang et al. (under review). The one-on-one prepa-
ration session was conducted by an experimenter of the same
nationality as the participant (Mary Helen Immordino-Yang con-
ducted the sessions in Los Angeles; Xiao-Fei Yang conducted those
in Beijing).
After the preparation session, participants underwent BOLD
fMRI with simultaneous electrocardiogram (ECG) recording as
they viewed a 5-s segment of each full-length narrative video
depicting the crux of the narrative with one sentence of verbal
information from the preparation session delivered both audito-
rily and transcribed underneath the image in stationary text (in
Mandarin or English), followed by 13 s of gray screen. For each
trial, participants reported via button press the real-time strength
of their feeling once they became aware of it (i.e., one button press
per trial; this press could happen at any point during the video or
gray screen). A cross appeared for 2 s to separate trials. Each nar-
rative was shown twice over the course of the fMRI experiment,
never twice during the same run, for a total of 100 trials divided
into four runs of approximately 9min each.
Experimenters stressed to participants that they should report
their experienced strength of emotion at the current time (i.e.,
that they should not report how they remember feeling in the
preparation session, or how they imagine the experimenters
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expect them to feel, or how they might usually feel, etc.). For
this purpose, a button box rested in the participant’s right hand.
Participants could report “no emotion,” “moderate emotion,”
“strong emotion,” or “overwhelmingly strong emotion.” Button
presses and TR timestamps were collected on an IBM Thinkpad
computer (IBM, Armonk, NY) running MATLAB (MATLAB
2007a, student version).
Participants abstained from caffeine, nicotine and medica-
tions for 24 h prior to the experiment. (None reported this being
unduly challenging.) Each participant arrived at the lab between
9:00 and 9:30 a.m. on the day of their participation. The prepa-
ration session ran for 2 h, and scanning began between 12:30 and
1:00 p.m. Following scanning, participants were asked to explain
in a second private session how they had felt about each narra-
tive from the experiment while in the scanner, to ensure that the
participants had remembered all of the narratives.
STIMULI
All participants were presented with the same video stimuli, sub-
titled in the participants’ native language. Each stimulus was
prepared in two versions. A full length version (average length
43 s) was utilized pre-scan to familiarize participants with the nar-
ratives; a 5-s segment from the full video, depicting the crux of the
narrative, was shown in the scanner.
Narrative stimuli depicted compelling, true stories featuring
real people (not actors) that unfolded like mini documentaries.
The corpus of 40 emotional stimuli was balanced for positive
and negative stories (stories had been piloted to induce vari-
eties of admiration and of compassion/empathy). Ten additional
control stimuli depicted more commonplace, less emotion pro-
voking stories, and had been piloted to elicit equivalent cognitive
and social processing as the emotion stimuli, but not to result in
strong emotion beyond interest. For consistency, all of the sto-
ries aimed to induce affiliative, pro-social reactions; we avoided
stimuli that would induce reactions such as moral indigna-
tion, hate, contempt, anger, etc. Stimulus categories/properties
are as described and justified in Immordino-Yang et al. (2009,
Supplemental Information), although the corpus of stimuli was
specifically developed for this study and only video stimuli were
included.
Stimuli for this experiment were constructed from stories
gathered from the Internet, television and other sources in the
U.S. and China. Half of the 50 true-life narratives featured pro-
tagonists from China (speaking Mandarin) and half featured
protagonists from the U.S. (speaking English; none were of Asian
descent). (We confirmed that viewing stimuli about protago-
nists from participants’ own vs. the other country produced no
effects; see Supplementary Analyses.) Stimuli about Chinese and
about American protagonists were matched by content theme.
Examples of matched content themes were: “talented physi-
cian sacrifices affluent lifestyle and dedicates his/her career to
helping the underprivileged” (positive, induces admiration for
virtue); “young person displays exceptional musical talent” (pos-
itive, induces admiration for skill); “physically disabled person
feels lonely and forgotten by previous friends” (negative, induces
compassion for social pain); “amateur sports player sustains a
painful leg injury” (negative, induces compassion/empathy for
physical pain); “professional man becomes a stay-at-home father”
(induces control social processing).
Potential stimuli were extensively piloted in Los Angeles and
in Beijing for emotional potency and for cultural equivalence
(i.e., for the likelihood that the narratives would result in quali-
tatively similar emotional reactions in Chinese and in American
young adults). They were also reviewed for cultural equivalence
by an expert in comparative Chinese and American culture at
USC and by a Chinese psychologist at BNU. Details on stimulus
development and piloting can be provided on request.
ECG DATA ACQUISITION AND PROCESSING
ECG was measured using a BIOPAC MP150 system with three
MRI-compatible electrodes placed on the participant’s chest and
sampled at a rate of 4000Hz. ECG recordings were preprocessed
in AcqKnowledge 9.32 (BIOPAC Systems, Inc.) to extract the R
peaks of the QRS complex. The resulting intervals between R
peaks were plotted and manually corrected for artifacts. RR inter-
val series were then uniformly re-sampled at 4Hz (Kubios HRV;
kubios.uku.fi/), transformed into heart-rate series (in beat-per-
min), and plotted relative to the average heart-rate from the 2-s
gray screen preceding the trial (Matlab 2011a). Cardiac arousal
was operationalized as the maximum increase in heart-rate across
the trial. (We note that peak values fell on average late in the trial,
at approximately 10 s post stimulus onset).
fMRI DATA ACQUISITION AND PROCESSING
The same scanner model and sequences were used to col-
lect neuroimaging data at BNU Imaging Center for Brain
Research and at USC Dana and David Dornsife Neuroimaging
Center. Whole brain images were acquired using a Siemens
3 Tesla MAGNETON TIM Trio scanner with a 12-channel
matrix head coil. Functional scans were acquired using a T∗2
weighted Echo Planar (EPI) sequence (TR = 2 s, TE = 30ms,
flip angle = 90◦, acquisition matrix: 64 × 64, FOV = 192mm)
with a voxel resolution of 3 × 3 × 4.5mm. We utilized PACE
(Prospective Acquisition CorrEction) to automatically correct for
motion during data acquisition. Thirty-two continuous trans-
verse slices were acquired to cover the whole brain and brain
stem. Functional data were acquired continuously for the dura-
tion of each run, with breaks between runs. Anatomical images
were acquired using a magnetization prepared rapid acquisi-
tion gradient (MPRAGE) sequence (TI = 900ms, TR = 1950ms,
TE = 2.26ms, flip angle = 7◦) with an isotropic voxel resolu-
tion of 1mm; 160 slices were acquired to cover the whole brain,
dimensions: 256 × 256 × 160.
Data from one male Chinese participant were excluded prior
to pre-processing due to excessive head movement (the sub-
ject coughed repeatedly). (The maximum head motion among
the remaining participants was 0.75mm, three dimensions
combined). The remaining data were processed using SPM8
(Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK)
in MATLAB 2009b (MathWorks, Inc.). Functional images were
slice timing corrected, aligned to the first volume acquired and
co-registered to the anatomical image. Co-registrations were
individually examined for each participant in native space to
ensure high quality alignment. Then, anatomical images were
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segmented and non-linearly normalized to MNI space (Montreal
Neurological Institute) using the standard probabilistic tissue
maps provided in SPM8. To account for size and shape differences
between East-Asian and Caucasian brains, affine regularization
was set specifically for each group and the results were verified
individually for each participant as follows: Individual verifica-
tions were conducted first for major landmark structures, lateral
boundaries and emotion-related regions for the whole brain, and
then for the boundaries and internal structural landmarks within
the insular cortex, including for anterior, posterior, dorsal, and
ventral insular boundaries and for the principal sulcus of insula.
See also below, section Identifying the Volumes of Interest. The
same normalization transformation was then applied to the func-
tional images. Finally, the images were smoothed using an 8-mm
FWHMGaussian kernel.
All data were subjected to session-specific grand mean scal-
ing, high-pass filtering with a cut-off period of 128 s and auto-
correlation correction using an AR(1) model.
SORTING THE TRIALS BY THE BEHAVIORAL DATA
In certain analyses, we were interested to depict the difference
in average BOLD activity level when participants experienced
genuine emotional feelings (of varying strengths) vs. when they
did not feel emotional. These analyses are identified throughout
the Materials and Methods Section, and included: modeling the
task-related BOLD response at the whole-brain level, utilizing
functional contrasts to identify the volumes of interest (VOIs),
and visualizing the event-related averages (ERAs) for emotion
and control in the VOIs. For these analyses, we did not assume
that every participant always experienced emotion to the emo-
tion trials and no emotion to the control trials (although this was
generally the case; see Table 1). Instead, we included only emo-
tion trials to which participants reported feeling emotional and
control trials to which participants reported feeling no emotion,
as determined by participants’ button press during the trial. We
realize that the particular stimuli included in each individual’s
analysis would differ; however, we reasoned that, given our aim,
it would be preferable in these particular analyses to have unifor-
mity of reported feeling strength than uniformity of stimuli (see
also Immordino-Yang et al., 2009, Supplementary Information).
The number of emotion and control trials included in these anal-
yses did not differ across the groups (emotion: F[2, 43] = 1.38,
p = 0.26, η2p = 0.060; control: F[2, 43] = 0.29, p = 0.75, η2p =
0.013). Excluded trials were modeled as a separate condition of
no interest.
In all other analyses, all trials were included.
MODELING THE TASK-RELATED BOLD RESPONSE AT THE
WHOLE-BRAIN LEVEL
In order to capture the complex neural activity during the 18-
s trial, each experiment condition (emotion and control) was
separately modeled at the individual level using a finite impulse
response function (FIR) with 9 time bins, each corresponding to
a 2-s TR. For each participant, the parameter estimates for each
condition were averaged over the 4th–8th time bins (correspond-
ing to the time window of 6–16 s post stimulus onset) to create
contrast maps that captured BOLD signal change relative to the
implicit baseline. The time window chosen had previously been
shown to capture the BOLD responses in this task (Immordino-
Yang et al., 2009), and can be further appreciated by viewing the
ERAs in Figures 3, 5. (Note: Trials were sorted by behavioral data
in this analysis; see above).
IDENTIFYING THE VOLUMES OF INTEREST (VOIs)
The contrast maps calculated above for emotion and for control
were entered into group-level random-effects full factorial mod-
els, one model for the CH group and one for the RA group.
The AI was functionally defined from the union of activation
clusters from the contrast of emotion vs. control for these two
groups, thresholded at p < 0.005 uncorrected and displayed on
a template brain (provided in MRICron, http://www.nitrc.org/
projects/mricron, Colin27 Brain). (The alignment of the insular
cortex had previously been confirmed individually for each par-
ticipant’s brain during the preprocessing phase). The posterior
boundary was defined dorsally by the principle sulcus, posterior
to the third short gyrus (Damasio, 1995), then extended directly
downward. (This boundary fell at y = −2). The resulting region
was divided into dorsal and ventral AI sectors by approximat-
ing the cytoarchitectonic boundary described by Mesulam and
Mufson (1982a). We then overlaid each VOI on each individual’s
anatomical image and confirmed that the anatomical localization
was accurate for all participants. The VOIs were confirmed by
Hanna Damasio, a neuroanatomist (see also Figure 1).
Since the contrast of emotion vs. control yielded only small
clusters of activation in the PI, we anatomically defined this
VOI using the Automated Anatomical Labeling Atlas (Tzourio-
Mazoyer et al., 2002), and defined the anterior boundary at
y = −4. As above, we overlaid the VOI on each individual’s
anatomical image and confirmed the accuracy of the anatomical
localization.
Table 1 | Behavioral data.
Chinese (CH) East-Asian American (AA) American (RA)
Emotion Control Emotion Control Emotion Control
(A) Mean feeling strength (SD) 2.27 (0.35) 1.38 (0.25) 2.26 (0.34) 1.40 (0.30) 2.22 (0.44) 1.30 (0.21)
(B) Percentage of successful trials (SD) 77.1 (12.5) 65.0 (22.5) 84.4 (9.5) 66.5 (21.1) 78.0 (16.7 ) 70.6 (19.8)
(A) Means and standard deviations for button press reports of feeling strength to emotion and control stimuli. Participants could report “1: no emotion,” “2:
moderate emotion,” “3: strong emotion,” or “4: overwhelmingly strong emotion.” (B) Percentages of “successful trials,” i.e., emotion trials in which participants
reported feeling emotional (button press of 2–4) and control trials in which participants felt no emotion (button press of 1).
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FIGURE 1 | Views of the dorsal anterior (pink), ventral anterior
(turquoise), and posterior (green) insula volumes of interest.
VISUALIZING EVENT-RELATED AVERAGES (ERAs) OF THE VOI BOLD
TIME COURSES FOR EMOTION AND CONTROL
BOLD time courses from voxels falling within the vAI, dAI,
and PI VOIs identified above were averaged to create one time
series for each condition, for each VOI, for each individual using
MarsBaR (Brett et al., 2002). These were fitted to a finite impulse
response function. Resulting beta values corresponding to the
average BOLD level for each bin were converted into percent
signal change relative to implicit baseline and averaged for each
group for each condition and plotted. (Note: Trials were sorted
by behavioral data in this analysis; see above.)
INITIAL ANALYSES
The aim of the initial analyses was to test whether the stimuli
were equally neurally and behaviorally effective in each cultural
group, i.e., whether the groups’ reports of emotion strength and
magnitude of BOLD signal change during emotion differed.
We tested for group differences in the magnitude of BOLD sig-
nal change during emotion processing in two ways: First, we used
a VOI approach. Working from the ERA plots calculated above,
we averaged each group’s BOLD magnitude for the emotion con-
dition over the 4th–8th TRs (the time window utilized for mod-
eling the task-related BOLD response at the whole-brain level)
and compared the three groups’ results using ANOVA. Second, we
used a voxel-wise approach. Working from whole-brain contrasts
of emotion vs. baseline, we conducted voxel-wise comparisons
of BOLD activation across the three groups using ANOVA and
examined the results in the AI, PI and other emotion-related
and social processing regions (amygdala, anterior cingulate, dor-
sal and ventral medial and lateral prefrontal cortex, precuneus,
and temporal-parietal junction). (Note: Trials had been sorted by
behavioral data in these analyses.)
We also tested for effects of viewing in-group vs. out-group
stimulus protagonists on the neural and behavioral data, and
found none (see Supplementary Analyses).
MAIN ANALYSES
Examining AI VOI activation levels for emotion vs. baseline for each
participant group separately
Working from the ERA plots of emotion calculated above, we
averaged each group’s BOLD magnitude over the 4th–8th TRs
(the time window utilized for modeling the task-related BOLD
response at the whole-brain level) and utilized a one-sample t-test
to determine whether activation was significantly greater than 0.
To confirm that the activations were consistent across pos-
itive/rewarding social emotion (i.e., for trials in which stimuli
aimed to induce admiration for virtue and for skill) and pain-
based/empathic social emotion (i.e., for trials in which stimuli
aimed to induce compassion for social pain and for physi-
cal injury), we also separately examined the activations asso-
ciated with stimuli from these sub-categories. We found that
both sub-categories of emotion stimuli produced significant
activation in all groups in both AI VOIs (see Supplementary
Table 1).
Examining whole-brain BOLD contrasts of emotion vs. control for
each participant group separately
The contrast maps capturing BOLD activation during the
emotion and control conditions were entered into group-level
random-effects full factorial models, one model for each partici-
pant group. We examined the contrast separately for each group,
correcting for multiple comparisons using the False Discovery
Rate correction at q(FDR) < 0.05. (Note: Trials were sorted by
behavioral data in this analysis; see above.)
Examining trial-by-trial correlations between fluctuations in VOI
BOLD responses, cardiac arousal and feeling strength
In these analyses, we aimed to characterize intra-subject co-
variation among the measures. To improve the BOLD and ECG
signal-to-noise ratios, we first averaged together the data corre-
sponding to the two presentations of the same narrative stimulus
(from different runs). That is, for each participant we calcu-
lated the average BOLD time-course for each VOI, heart-rate
response time-course, and feeling strength (button press value)
corresponding to the two presentations of the same narrative.
We then identified the peak values for the resulting BOLD and
heart-rate response time courses. Peaks were defined as the local
maximum of greatest magnitude. Taking into account the hemo-
dynamic delay, we excluded the first two TRs when identifying the
BOLD peak. This method produced 50 sets of 3 values for each
participant for each VOI. (In the rare case where no peaks were
identified within a time course, the corresponding set of values
was excluded from further analysis.)
We then calculated for each participant, across the 50 sets of
values, for AI VOIs:
(1) the partial correlation coefficient between the magnitude of
the BOLD peak and the magnitude of the heart-rate peak,
controlling for the feeling strength. This calculation was
repeated after controlling for PI activity.
(2) the partial correlation coefficient between the magnitude
of the BOLD peak and the feeling strength, controlling for
the magnitude of the heart-rate peak. This calculation was
repeated after controlling for the variance shared between the
dAI and the vAI VOIs in the magnitude of the BOLD peak
and after controlling for PI activity.
Given the results, we decided post-hoc to calculate:
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(3) the correlation coefficient between the timing of the BOLD
peak and the button-press response time (i.e., the time the
participant required to become aware of and report the
strength of their current emotional feeling).
We tested for effects of cultural group on these correlation coef-
ficients using ANOVA, and utilized 2-tailed, one sample t-tests
to characterize the consistency of the correlations within each
cultural group for each AI VOI.
Finally, we tested correlations between PI activity, cardiac
arousal, and feeling strength.
We conducted all tests on the left and right VOIs separately
and every result was consistent between the left and right;
therefore, results reported are bilateral.
Notes: The main analyses were designed to avoid directly com-
paring the magnitude of BOLD signal collected from different
scanners. The trial-by-trial analyses were designed to additionally
avoid the problem of multiple comparisons (and the associated
problem of overestimated effect sizes) when statistically compar-
ing the cultural groups. The inclusion of the AA group served in
part to verify that cultural differences were not due to anatomical
normalization issues with Asian brains.
RESULTS
INITIAL RESULTS
Validating the experiment protocol, the emotion stimuli were
equally neurally and behaviorally effective in each cultural group.
Every participant reported feeling emotional during the experi-
ment. There were no cultural group differences in participants’
reported strength of feelings (F[2, 43] = 0.16, p = 0.86, η2p =
0.007) or in the proportion of scanner trials to which partici-
pants reported feeling emotional (F[2, 43] = 1.38, p = 0.27, η2p =
0.060; see also Figure 2 and Table 1). Utilizing the VOI approach,
we found no differences in AI BOLD activation during emo-
tion relative to baseline in either hemisphere (dAI: F[2, 43] = 0.55,
p = 0.58, η2p = 0.025; vAI: F[2, 43] = 1.12, p = 0.33, η2p = 0.050;
results reported are bilateral). Utilizing the voxel-wise approach,
the peak effect size in the AI was F[2, 43] = 2.47, p = 0.09 uncor-
rected (not a significant difference).
We found no significant differences in activation magnitude
in any of the other emotion-related or social processing regions
examined, even at the lenient threshold of p < 0.005 uncorrected
for multiple comparisons.
The post-scan interviews revealed that, almost universally, par-
ticipants remembered every narrative and described pro-social,
affiliative reactions; i.e., they reported liking/feeling sympathetic
toward/feeling engaged with the protagonists.
MAIN RESULTS
Emotion vs. baseline processing
As expected, relative to baseline, each group showed significant
activation in each AI VOI during emotion. Results in the dAI can
be appreciated by viewing Figure 3, right hand panel. Activations
of the vAI VOI (bilateral and averaged across the 4th–8th TR)
were as follows: CH: t[13] = 5.31, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 1.42,
95% CI [0.10, 0.23]; AA: t[15] = 4.72, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d =
FIGURE 2 | Distributions of participants’ button-press responses
during fMRI/ECG, describing the strength of their emotional feelings
to each stimulus. Participants could report “no emotion” (1), “moderate
emotion” (2), “strong emotion” (3), or “overwhelmingly strong emotion”
(4). The groups’ distributions do not differ significantly.
1.18, 95% CI [0.06, 0.16]; RA: t[15] = 4.85, p < 0.001, Cohen’s
d = 1.21, 95% CI [0.07, 0.19].
Emotion vs. control processing
To begin to address whether BOLD activation reflected feeling
strength, we examined each group’s whole-brain BOLD activa-
tion pattern, and ERA plots, for emotion vs. control. We found
that the dAI was activated for emotion relative to control in the
RA and AA groups but not in the CH group; see Figure 3. The
CH group showed comparable dAI activation for the emotion and
control conditions. The vAI was activated for this contrast in all
groups (see also Table 2).
These results suggested that dAI activation was associated with
feeling strength only in the American groups and that vAI acti-
vation was associated with feelings in all groups. We tested these
possibilities and the relations of BOLD activity to interoceptive
processing via the analyses presented below.
Trial-by-trial results
Anterior insula. As expected, even after controlling for feeling
strength, BOLD magnitude was consistently positively correlated
with cardiac arousal in each AI VOI (vAI: t[45] = 3.83, p < 0.001,
Cohen’s d = 0.56, 95% CI [0.05, 0.15]; dAI: t[45] = 4.87, p <
0.001, Cohen’s d = 0.72, 95% CI [0.08, 0.19]). ANOVA revealed
no effect of cultural group in either sector (vAI: p = 0.86, η2p =
0.007; dAI: p = 0.87, η2p = 0.006).
As the results from the emotion vs. control contrasts sug-
gested may be the case, controlling for cardiac arousal, the RA
and CH groups showed a significant interaction between cultural
group and AI sector on the relationship between BOLD and feel-
ing strength (F[1, 28] = 4.56, p = 0.042, η2p = 0.140). A planned
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FIGURE 3 | BOLD contrasts and corresponding event-related averages
(ERAs) of dorsal anterior insula (dAI) activity during emotion
processing (in which emotion provoking narratives were shown and
participants reported feeling emotional) and control processing (in
which relatively unemotional narratives were shown and participants
reported feeling no emotion). Contrasts are displayed on a template brain
at z = 3 (MNI space), thresholded at q(FDR) < 0.05; arrows indicate the
dAI. For simplicity we report the bilateral ERA results, as the left and right
dAI showed no appreciable differences. ERAs are plotted with ±one
standard error, uncorrected for hemodynamic delay. Notes: ERA BOLD
responses for emotion reveal that all groups showed activation relative to
baseline; however, only in the RA and AA groups was activation for emotion
higher than for control. In the CH group, emotion and control resulted in
comparable activation in the dAI (although other emotion-related regions
showed significant activation for this contrast; see Table 2).
linear contrast placed the AA group’s results between those of the
CH and RA groups; see Figure 4.
To characterize the origins of this interaction, we examined
each group’s results. Controlling for cardiac arousal, we found
that vAI BOLD magnitude was consistently positively correlated
with feeling strength across participants in each of the cultural
groups (CH: t[13] = 4.23, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 1.13, 95% CI
[0.08, 0.24]; AA: t[15] = 3.16, p = 0.006, Cohen’s d = 0.79, 95%
CI [0.04, 0.22]; RA: t[15] = 2.96, p = 0.010, Cohen’s d = 0.74,
95% CI [0.03, 0.17]). However, dAI magnitude was consistently
correlated with feeling strength in the American groups only
(CH: t[13] = 1.75, p = 0.11, Cohen’s d = 0.47, 95% CI [−0.02,
0.23]; AA: t[15] = 2.67, p = 0.017, Cohen’s d = 0.67, 95% CI
[0.02, 0.21]; RA: t[15] = 3.94, p = 0.001, Cohen’s d = 0.98, 95%
CI [0.07, 0.22]).
The cultural effect became especially pronounced when we
examined the unique contributions of each AI sector to explain-
ing feeling strength in each cultural group. Partialling out shared
variance in BOLD magnitude between vAI and dAI, and con-
trolling for magnitude of cardiac arousal, in the CH group vAI
activation magnitude was consistently positively correlated with
feeling strength but dAI activation magnitude was not (CH:
vAI: t[13] = 2.98, p = 0.010, Cohen’s d = 0.80, 95% CI [0.03,
0.19]; dAI: t[13] = −0.12, p = 0.91, Cohen’s d = −0.03, 95% CI
[−0.13, 0.12]). By contrast, in the RA group, vAI activation
magnitude was not correlated with feeling strength, but dAI acti-
vation magnitude was (RA: vAI: t[15] = −0.71, p = 0.49, Cohen’s
d = −0.18, 95% CI [−0.10, 0.05]; dAI: t[15] = 2.95, p = 0.010,
Cohen’s d = 0.74, 95% CI [0.03, 0.19]). The AA group showed
a shared variance pattern, intermediate between the CH and RA
groups (AA: vAI: t[15] = 1.27, p = 0.22, Cohen’s d = 0.32, 95%
CI [−0.04, 0.15]; dAI: t[15] = 0.65, p = 0.53, Cohen’s d = 0.16,
95% CI [−0.07, 0.12]).
Posterior insula. PI activity correlated robustly with cardiac
arousal in each group (groups combined: t[45] = 6.79, p < 0.001,
Cohen’s d = 1.00, 95% CI [0.13, 0.25]) even when controlling
for vAI and dAI activity and feeling strength (groups combined:
t[45] = 5.33, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 0.79, 95% CI [0.09, 0.19]).
As expected, PI activity was not significantly correlated with feel-
ing strength in any group (groups combined: t[45] = 0.74, p =
0.47, Cohen’s d = 0.11, 95% CI [−0.03, 0.07]). Controlling for
PI activity, the pattern of correlations between vAI and dAI activ-
ity and feeling strength did not change from those reported above
(i.e., all reported correlations were robust, and no new corre-
lations emerged). This was true despite that controlling for PI
activity rendered vAI and dAI correlations to cardiac arousal
non-significant.
Post-hoc analysis of how dAI activation timing was related to
decisions about feelings
The analyses above demonstrate that dAI activation magnitude
was not related to feeling strength in the CH group. However, they
leave open the question of whether the dAI activation observed
across groups relative to baseline was related to a cognitive process
that is invoked for decisions about feelings. In the CH group, this
process could have been invoked no matter the feeling strength.
Supporting this interpretation, we found that in all groups the
timing of the dAI peak BOLD activation tracked the time par-
ticipants required to decide how strongly they felt (i.e., positively
correlated with button press response time; CH: t[13] = 3.80, p =
0.002, Cohen’s d = 1.02, 95% CI [0.08, 0.28]; AA: t[15] = 3.09,
p = 0.007, Cohen’s d = 0.77, 95% CI [0.04, 0.21]; RA: t[15] =
2.43, p = 0.028, Cohen’s d = 0.61, 95% CI [0.02, 0.26]). This
effect was not seen in the ventral sector (CH: t[13] = 1.15, p =
0.27, Cohen’s d = 0.31, 95% CI [−0.04, 0.12]; AA: t[15] = 0.67,
p = 0.51, Cohen’s d = 0.17, 95% CI [−0.07, 0.14]; RA: t[15] =
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Table 2 | BOLD maxima for emotion vs. control in the anterior insula and other emotion-related brain regions for Chinese and American
participant groups, in MNI space, from separate whole-brain analyses.
Region Chinese (CH) East-Asian American (AA) American (RA)
X Y Z z score X Y Z z score X Y Z z score
Anterior insula
Ventral −44 8 −12 3.64 −38 −2 10 3.31 −46 8 −4 3.37
42 6 −10 3.91 38 12 −12 3.55 48 12 −6 4.33
Dorsal −32 12 4 5.00 −26 20 6 4.05
32 22 4 3.69 30 22 10 4.28
3rd short gyrus/
principle sulcus
−38 6 8 3.39 −34 12 2 4.91 −46 8 0 3.64
40 4 0 3.13 44 10 −2 4.22 42 8 12 3.99
Posterior insula −36 −16 −4 4.13 −36 −8 12 3.63 42 −4 −10 3.23
Anterior cingulate −2 −2 36 4.2 4 16 44 3.35 0 16 38 4.84
Posterior cingulate −10 −26 36 4.28 −4 −34 34 3.71 −14 −38 44 3.49
12 −24 48 4.31 8 −44 12 3.43 14 −36 44 3.31
Precuneus −12 −56 62 5.40 −8 −74 50 5.08 −8 −60 62 5.50
10 −52 64 4.40 2 −60 60 3.97 14 −66 52 5.17
Supramarginal gyrus −60 −34 30 3.94 −58 −44 32 3.34 −56 −38 38 6.42
68 −24 18 3.11 66 −38 28 3.53 62 −26 58 5.36
Mesencephalon −12 −16 −8 4.64 −8 −24 −10 4.04
12 −24 −12 5.89 12 −24 −12 3.71
Activation thresholds were determined by the False Discovery Rate statistic, q(FDR) < 0.05. Note significant activation for emotion relative to control in the ventral
anterior insula for all groups, but in the anterior-most portions of the dorsal anterior insula for the American groups only. (All groups showed activation in the dorsal
sector of the 3rd short gyrus/principle sulcus of insula, in a location corresponding to the posterior border of the dorsal anterior insula. Voxels corresponding to this
activation were included in the dAI VOI).
1.33, p = 0.20, Cohen’s d = 0.33, 95% CI [−0.03, 0.12]). We
also note that button-pressing was right handed but that the cor-
relation between dAI activation timing and response time held
bilaterally, making it unlikely to be attributable to the motor act
of pressing the response button.
Replication
We successfully replicated the cultural group difference in the cor-
respondence between dAI activation and feeling strength using
data previously collected for two studies of the same social emo-
tions, one involving 13 American participants in Los Angeles (i.e.,
a novel analysis of the data first presented in Immordino-Yang
et al., 2009) and one involving 14 Chinese participants in Beijing
(not previously published; see Figure 5).
DISCUSSION
CULTURAL GROUP DIFFERENCES IN THE NEURAL PROCESSING OF
SOCIAL-EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCES
We interpret our findings first to suggest that the neural process
by which social emotions are experienced is relatively indepen-
dent from interoception at the cortical level. In three separate
participant groups, one Chinese and two American, cardiac
arousal and participants’ reports of emotional feeling strength
contributed independently to explaining variance in AI activ-
ity as participants reacted to emotion inducing narratives. In
addition, controlling for PI activity rendered AI correlations
to cardiac arousal negligible and non-significant, but did not
alter patterns of correlation between AI activity and feelings.
These findings are somewhat unexpected given current neuro-
biological accounts of feelings. However, they accord well with
psychological accounts that emotional feelings are conceptually
mediated and reinforce the possibility that this conceptual medi-
ation is acquired from social encounters and shaped by cultural
norms.
Aligned with this possibility, we also found group differences
in how variance in AI activity correlated with participants’ reports
of their experienced feeling strength. Most notably, in the data
from three American participant groups (two collected for the
main study and one collected for a previous study, Immordino-
Yang et al., 2009), dAI activation was greater the more strongly
emotional participants reported feeling. By contrast, in the data
from two Chinese participant groups (one collected for the main
study and one utilized to replicate the main finding), dAI activa-
tion magnitude was unrelated to the strength of social-emotional
feelings participants reported experiencing. This was true despite
an absence of cultural group differences in the magnitude of AI
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FIGURE 4 | Graph illustrating cultural differences in how ventral and
dorsal anterior insula activation correlated with emotional feeling
strength. Scores represent the difference in the strength of correlation
between dorsal and ventral activations and feelings (r dAI to feelings minus
r vAI to feelings). Each data point represents one experiment participant.
Boxes extend one quartile above and one quartile below the mean. The
zero line represents equal correlation to feelings across the two AI sectors.
A planned linear contrast revealed a significant difference across the
cultural groups (∗F[1, 43] = 5.14, p = 0.028, η2p = 0.107), and placed the AA
group’s results between those of the other groups.
BOLD signal change to emotion stimuli and an absence of group
differences in participants’ reported strength of feelings across the
experiment. Notably, we did find that the magnitude of activity in
the vAI correlated with feeling strength across the groups in the
main study, and that the timing of the peak activation in the dAI
was specifically related to the time at which individuals reported
their emotional feeling (see also Figure 6).
Taking these findings together, dAI activity in the CH group
appears to have reflected decision timing but not feeling strength,
while dAI activity in the RA and AA groups appears to have
reflected both decision timing and feeling strength. We inter-
pret this difference as evidence that culture may influence the
process by which individuals construct conscious experiences of
social emotion, even though, as expected, we found no evidence
that culture influences basic interoceptive processing. The broad
psychological implication is that conscious assessment of emo-
tion strength is subjective and context dependent—in essence, it
appears to reflect cultural strategies that are deployed relatively
independently of the body’s emotion-related visceral changes (see
sections Implications for the Psychological Process by Which
Emotions are Experienced and Arousal vs. Feeling Strength, for
additional interpretation).
VENTRAL AND DORSAL AI CONTRIBUTIONS TO EMOTIONAL FEELINGS
Our findings are relevant to open questions concerning how the
insula supports feelings. In particular, research on somatic stimu-
lation has demonstrated that PI activity increases proportionately
to actual body stimulation (such as proportionately to temper-
ature increases in a thermal stimulus) but AI activity increases
proportionately to an individual’s affective, context-dependent
experience of the somatosensory stimulus (e.g., as subjectively
painful or not; Craig et al., 2000). Our findings are consistent
with assertions that it is therefore the AI that supports conscious
feelings, including feelings of emotion (Craig, 2002).
Our findings are also consistent with the known cognitive
functions of the dAI (e.g., Mutschler et al., 2009; Kurth et al.,
2010; Nelson et al., 2010; Touroutoglou et al., 2012), with sug-
gestions that the dAI supports emotion awareness (Craig, 2002;
Critchley et al., 2004; Gu et al., 2013), and with assertions that
the vAI’s functioning is related to strength of subjective affect,
or feelings (e.g., Kurth et al., 2010; Touroutoglou et al., 2012).
However, our findings suggest that the ventral and dorsal AI sec-
tors’ relative contributions to feelings are influenced by exposure
to culture: in the CH group, feeling strength was more associ-
ated with vAI activation, while in the RA group, feeling strength
was more associated with dAI activation. The intermediate results
from the AA group, which is bicultural, support the interpreta-
tion that the CH to RA group difference is related to cultural
exposure.
Considering the complexity of the AI’s anatomical and func-
tional connectivity (Mesulam and Mufson, 1982b; Mufson and
Mesulam, 1982; Seeley et al., 2007; Menon and Uddin, 2010;
Nelson et al., 2010) and the fact that this region’s connectiv-
ity changes across child development (Uddin et al., 2011), the
cultural differences we found could be said to open more ques-
tions than they answer. Especially given the pivotal role the
AI plays in functional network activation (Menon and Uddin,
2010), it is unlikely that the cultural effects we observed are
limited to this region or to the processing of social-emotional
feelings. The AI is involved in a variety of basic processes such
as attention orienting (Menon and Uddin, 2010; Nelson et al.,
2010), chemosensory perception (e.g., for taste and olfaction,
Mesulam and Mufson, 1982b; Small, 2010) and experiencing and
observing others experiencing disgust (Wicker et al., 2003). It
is also involved in more complex psychological processes such
as affective processing and regulation (Craig, 2002; Wager and
Barrett, 2004; Paulus and Stein, 2006), decision-making (Brass
and Haggard, 2010; Naqvi and Bechara, 2010; Naqvi et al., 2014),
moral judgment (Moll et al., 2005), self-referential processing
(D’Argembeau et al., 2012), and social emotions such as sympa-
thy (Decety and Michalska, 2010), empathy (Singer et al., 2004),
rejection (Eisenberger et al., 2003; Cacioppo et al., 2013), com-
passion (Bruneau et al., 2012), and love (Bartels and Zeki, 2004;
Cacioppo et al., 2012). Our findings point toward the need to
investigate possible cultural differences in AI activity and net-
work connectivity across various domains of processing, as well
as the need for studies probing the developmental mechanisms
by which culture or experience (e.g., with compassion medita-
tion; Lutz et al., 2009) may be organizing or biasing this region’s
functioning.
In future investigations, it will be important to keep in mind
that, despite ubiquitous assumptions to the contrary, similar lev-
els/locations of neural activity across individuals or groups of
participants during an experimental task may not correspond to
similar psychological processing. In our study, the cultural group
differences were found in the patterns of correlation between
BOLD signal magnitude and participants’ reports of their experi-
enced feeling strength, rather than in the magnitude of the BOLD
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FIGURE 5 | Replicating the cultural group difference in how dAI
activation correlated with participants’ experienced feeling strength.
Event-related averages for the dorsal anterior insula (dAI) BOLD response
time courses for social emotion and control from (A) an additional study
conducted with a separate group of Beijing Normal University students
(n = 14; 7 females; average age 22.8, SD = 2.43; monolingual
Mandarin-speaking) and from (B) a previous study with American participants
(Immordino-Yang et al., 2009; n = 13; participants were native
English-speaking). Plots are as in Figure 3. Methods: Voxels were taken from
6mm spheres centered at x = ±33; y = 22; z = 4, depicted in pink in the
inset. The protocol, scanner model, functional scanning sequence, and data
analysis techniques were equivalent between these two studies and the
current study except that ECG was not collected, and the narrative stimuli
were from a different corpus than those used in the current study. Protocol
Validation: All participants reported feeling emotional during the experiment,
and there were no differences in the strength of feelings that Chinese
participants reported over the course of the experiment as compared to the
strength of feelings the American participants reported, t[24] = 1.33,
p = 0.20, Cohen’s d = 0.39, 95% CI [−0.70, 0.15]. Results: Consistent with
the main study, the dAI is comparably activated for both stimulus types in the
data from Chinese participants, while the dAI shows stronger activation for
emotion than for control processing in the data from American participants.
Trial-by-trial analyses reinforced this result: Feeling strength was not
correlated with dAI activation level trial-by-trial in the Chinese replication
group: t[13] = 1.15, p = 0.27, Cohen’s d = 0.31, 95% CI [−0.05, 0.16]; but,
feeling strength was correlated with dAI activation in the American group:
t[11] = 4.38, p = 0.001, Cohen’s d = 1.26, 95% CI [0.08, 0.25]. (Button press
values were missing for one American participant.)
signal itself. This result underscores the need to include relevant
psychological measures in future investigations of possible cul-
tural and individual similarities and differences in activity, and in
anatomical and functional connectivity, of the insula and other
neural systems (Immordino-Yang, 2013).
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESS BY WHICH
EMOTIONS ARE EXPERIENCED
One potential explanation for our findings is that individuals
from more expressive cultures, like American culture, learn over
time to rely more heavily on somatosensory processing mech-
anisms in deciding their strength of feelings, as there would
presumably be more information in the body response (or sim-
ulated, predicted or “as-if” body response; Damasio, 1999; Seth,
2013). In more expressive individuals, feelings could therefore
become more closely associated with the activity of the dAI
because of its somatosensory properties. By contrast, cultural
groups that value calmness, like Chinese, may learn over time
that mechanisms of autonomic modulation provide more impor-
tant clues to emotion strength; in these groups, conscious feelings
may become more associated with the activity of the vAI because
of its modulatory role. These developmental mechanisms could
hold whether or not different categories of emotion are asso-
ciated with distinct or culturally universal patterns of behavior
(cf. Jack et al., 2012; Nummenmaa et al., 2014), and whether
or not emotions are found to have categorically distinct neu-
ral correlates (Hamann, 2012). This proposed mechanism would
also be consistent with evidence that European Americans have a
stronger ability to become consciously aware of heart-beat sensa-
tions than do Asian Americans on average, and that this ability
has been associated with individuals’ likelihood of experiencing
non-socially induced emotional arousal as relevant to the social
context (Ma-Kellams et al., 2012).
In support of this idea, in a separate study (Immordino-Yang
et al., under review) we demonstrated that approximately 15%
of the inter-individual variability in the correspondence between
dAI activations and feeling strength across the groups is explained
by participants’ natural emotional expressiveness in a private
interview outside of the MRI scanner. It would be interesting in
the future to investigate additional psychological, behavioral, and
neural correlates of the considerable inter-individual variability in
the correspondence between BOLD activity and feeling strength
to determine whether it may relate to other known sources of
individual and cultural variation in emotion-related values, expe-
riences and behavior (Ekman, 1971; Markus and Kitayama, 1991;
Mesquita and Frijda, 1992; Eid and Diener, 2001; Tsai, 2007;
Matsumoto et al., 2008) and neural activity (Han and Northoff,
2008; Cheon et al., 2013; Chiao et al., 2013; Han et al., 2013). Such
studies could begin by investigating how the effects we discovered
could be relevant to understanding variability in the role of bodily
reactions in the experience of emotion (Tsai et al., 2004; Barrett
et al., 2007; Chentsova-Dutton and Tsai, 2010; Dunn et al., 2010;
Ma-Kellams et al., 2012), and to mental and physical health, for
example to understanding cultural differences in the prevalence
of somatization disorders (Parker et al., 2001; Ryder et al., 2008)
and cultural and social contextual effects on pain experience and
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FIGURE 6 | Schematic depicting the magnitude (a) and the timing (b) of
the peak BOLD response. The shaded region represents the timewindow in
which the BOLD signal peak was identified. Five-second video stimuli were
shown starting at time 0, followed by 13 s of gray screen and 2 s of a fixation
cross. Controlling for cardiac arousal: for the dorsal anterior insula, a is related
to feeling strength, but only in the American participant groups; b is related to
the time participants required to report a decision about their feeling strength
in all groups. For the ventral anterior insula, a is related to feeling strength for
all groups; b is unrelated to reports of feeling strength.
tolerance (e.g., Edwards et al., 2001; Eisenberger et al., 2006;
Rahim-Williams et al., 2007).
Overall, our findings lend credence to efforts to study cul-
tural and individual variability in the construction of emotional
feelings, and to efforts to understand how this variability may
contribute social-emotional liabilities or sources of resilience
depending on individuals’ predispositions and on the context.
A highly productive literature has linked the effects of subop-
timal social environments and social relationships, such as are
associated with poverty, abuse and neglect, to brain development
and maladaptive socio-emotional functioning (Cicchetti, 2004;
Hackman et al., 2010). Our study suggests that exposure to cul-
ture, which is a normative, positive source of adaptive variability
in social development, also influences how individuals experience
emotions.
AROUSAL vs. FEELING STRENGTH
Importantly, it is unlikely that the cultural difference we found
in the neural processing of feelings is attributable to interoceptive
processing of arousal. Although of course the AI maps visceral
states beyond those associated with the heart, changes in cardiac
activity are arguably among the most robust and salient visceral
manifestations of emotional arousal. Yet, the cultural effect we
found held after controlling for variance in AI activity that cor-
related with cardiac arousal and after controlling for PI activity,
which rendered AI correlations to cardiac arousal non-significant
and negligible. A follow-up analysis revealed that feeling strength
and cardiac arousal were not significantly correlated trial-by-
trial in any group (groups combined: t[45] = 1.29, p = 0.20,
Cohen’s d = 0.19, 95% CI [−0.02, 0.10]). Our findings there-
fore accord well with psychological evidence that experiences of
emotion—conscious feelings—do not correspond in one-to-one
fashion with measures of body arousal or with embodied sen-
sations (Barrett et al., 2007). They also accord with reports that
contributions of arousal and body sensations to emotional feel-
ings and to emotion-related somatosensory neural activations
vary across people and contexts (Barrett et al., 2007; Dunn et al.,
2010; Saxbe et al., 2013).
NOTES CONCERNING THE PARTICULAR EMOTIONS OUR STIMULI
INDUCED
Although this was not the main focus of our study, it is notable
that our findings appear to be consistent across the range of pos-
itively and negatively valenced social emotions we induced (see
also Supplementary Figure 1). Some of our stimuli (meant to
induce varieties of admiration) induced rewarding, energizing,
positive feelings, often described by participants as feelings of
inspiration, motivation, and amazement; others of our stimuli
(meant to induce varieties of compassion) induced painful feel-
ings, and participants often described feeling “awful” or “bad.”
This difference does not seem to have been reflected in our
findings.
In addition, the feelings we tested varied on the extent to
which they require complex social-cognitive inferences about the
protagonist’s broader situation, or instead can be more directly,
empathically induced by mirroring the emotion that the protago-
nist shows. Emotions like admiration for virtue and compassion
for social pain require complex inferences about the protagonist’s
experience relative to his or her cumulative life circumstances. By
contrast, reactions to another’s painful injury are relatively auto-
matic and empathic. Here, the participant vicariously experiences
the protagonist’s physical pain and need not reflect much on the
person’s character traits or personal history to appreciate the pro-
tagonist’s current emotion. Future studies will need to address
these issues more fully, and to test whether our results extend
beyond the prosocial, affiliative emotions we studied to antiso-
cial emotions like hate, moral disgust, or contempt, to empathic
emotions other than compassion for physical pain (like empathic
happiness or pride), to varieties of non-social emotions like dis-
gust to sanitation hazards, or to feelings unrelated to emotion, like
hunger or physical pain.
CONCLUSION
In sum, we found that AI processing of cardiac arousal, a
basic function developmentally and evolutionarily, was consis-
tent across cultural groups, and that AI processing of feelings, a
highly developed psychological capability, showed cultural effects.
Although this study does not address the origins of these cultural
effects, the findings suggest that the ability of the human brain to
construct conscious feelings of social emotion is less closely tied
to visceral states than many neurobiological models predict and
at least partly culturally acquired.
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